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The Effect of Immigration on the School Performance of Natives: 
Cross Country Evidence Using PISA Test Scores
* 
 
We study whether a higher share of immigrant pupils affects the school performance of 
natives using aggregate multi-country data from PISA. We find evidence of a negative and 
statistically significant relationship. The size of the estimated effect is small: doubling the 
share of immigrant pupils in secondary schools from its current sample average of 4.8 
percent to close to 10 percent would reduce the test score of natives by 1.32 to 1.96 percent, 
depending on the selected group of natives. There is also evidence that – conditional on the 
average share of immigrant pupils – reducing the dispersion of this share between schools 
has small positive effects on the test scores of natives. 
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 Introduction  
 
Immigration flows have changed the composition of students in schools and 
classes. The integration of immigrants is often problematic, and these flows have 
triggered in some countries the flight of natives from public to private schools. A key 
question is whether the increased share of immigrants in schools and classes has 
affected the school performance of natives. In spite of the importance of this question 
for education policy, and of the abundance of research investigating the labour market 
effects of immigrants, relatively little is known about the impact of immigration on the 
education system (see Gould, Lavy and Paserman, 2009).  
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to address this important question using 
cross – country data covering European and Anglo-Saxon countries. Measuring the 
effect of immigrants on the school performance of natives is complicated by the fact 
that immigrants sort across countries and both immigrant and native students self-select 
into schools and classes. For example, the share of immigrants in the total population is 
typically higher in more developed countries, where economic opportunities are more 
abundant. At the same time, students in these countries tend to have a better 
performance, because their schooling systems are more effective. Therefore, the average 
test scores of native students and the share of immigrants tend to be positively 
correlated across countries, but this correlation is spurious and driven by cross-country 
differences in economic development.  
Due to economic conditions, immigrants usually concentrate in less affluent 
neighbourhoods, where housing prices are lower. Typically, the schools of these 
neighbourhoods are attended both by immigrant students with limited language 
proficiency and by native students with a relatively poor parental background. By virtue 
of this sorting, a negative correlation between the test scores of natives and the share of 
immigrants in the school is likely to emerge within each country quite independently of 
whether immigrants have or have not any impact on the school performance of native 
students. Non random allocation of students to schools implies that it is difficult to tell 
whether the correlation between the performance of natives and the share of immigrants 
in a school can be treated as a causal relationship.    3
In this paper, we address sorting within countries by aggregating at the country 
level the key information on the test scores of natives and the shares of immigrant 
students. By virtue of aggregation, we remove the sorting of individuals across schools
1. 
However, immigrants can sort also among different countries. Using data that vary by 
country and time, we control for between - country migration flows by conditioning on 
country fixed effects and on the stock of immigrants in a given country at a given time. 
Conditional on this stock, the share of immigrant pupils in each country depends mainly 
on demographic factors and is as good as random, as pointed out by Gould, Lavy and 
Paserman, 2009, in their study of the effects of immigration in Israel schools.  
We find that a higher share of immigrant pupils reduces the school performance 
of 15-years old natives. The marginal effect, however, is small and varies with the 
gender and the parental background of natives. Our evidence suggests that doubling the 
share of immigrant students from the current average 5 percent to 10 percent
2 would 
reduce the average school performance of natives by 1.32 to 1.96 percent. The highest 
negative effect is found for natives with relatively poor parental background, who 
typically concentrate in schools with a high proportion of immigrants.  
We also find that the estimated effect of immigrant pupils on the school 
performance of natives is higher in countries where the segregation of immigrants in 
schools is higher. However, the quantitative impact of desegregation policies suggested 
by our estimates is small, as we find that halving the index of segregation would 
increase the test performance of natives by only 0.86 to 1.28 percent.   
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is a brief review of the relevant 
literature and Section 3 presents our empirical approach. The data and the main results 
are presented in Sections 4 and 5. Section 6 presents some robustness checks and an 
important extension. Conclusions follow.  
 
2. Review of the Literature  
 
                                                 
1 Borjas (2003), Mishra (2007) and Aydemir and Borjas (2007) among others use a similar strategy to 
estimate the impact of the share of immigrants on wages. 
2 To illustrate, if immigrant students were evenly distributed across the schools in our sample, doubling 
their share would be equivalent to increasing the number of immigrants from 1 to 2 in classes with about 
20 students.   4
The influence of immigrant students on their native peers is a particular sort of 
peer effect: immigrants are peers with a different culture, a different way to interact 
with others and, most often, limited language proficiency. In a recent contribution to the 
vast literature on peer effects, Lavy et al., 2009, have shown that the effect of peers is 
not constant but strongest when peers are students either at the very bottom or at the 
very top of the academic ability distribution. Since immigrant pupils typically perform 
less well than natives at school for several reasons, including difficulties with the 
language of instruction, less educated parents and problems of integration, they are 
often concentrated at the bottom of the distribution of academic ability. According to 
Lavy’s work, their effect on native pupils should be stronger than the effect generated 
by native peers. 
While the economic literature on peer effects in education is extensive, there is 
surprisingly little being done on the influence of immigrant students on native students. 
Early contributions include Betts, 1998, and Hoxby, 1998. Betts shows that immigration 
reduces the probability of completing high-schools for American-native minorities 
(Blacks and Hispanics). The reason is that an influx of students with limited proficiency 
in English absorbs teaching resources especially at the expense of those native students 
who are at the margin of dropping out and typically belong to American minorities. No 
negative effect of immigrants is found for non minority groups. While Hoxby suggests 
that immigrant students crowd minority natives out of universities and colleges by 
competing for scarce remedial resources, Borjas, 2004, finds that the increasing number 
of immigrant students in the US crowds white American-native males out of 
universities, especially in elite institutions. 
Betts and Fairlie, 2003, find that American native students fly towards private 
secondary schools in response to the influx of immigrants into public institutions
3. At 
least two reasons might explain this flight towards private fee-based schools. First, 
native households may dislike sending their children to schools that attract immigrants; 
second, a high share of immigrants may signal to households that the school is low 
quality.  
Gould, Lavy and Paserman, 2009, exploit the mass migration of Jews from the 
former Soviet Union to Israel in the early 1990s to assess the long run impact of 
                                                 
3 No flight has been observed out of primary schools.   5
immigrants on native students. They find that a higher share of immigrants in the fifth 
grade has a negative influence on the probability of passing the final matriculation 
exam. Their identification strategy is based on the assumption that, conditional on the 
total number of immigrant students admitted to a given school, the variation in the 
proportion of immigrants across grades of the same school can be considered as due 
solely to exogenous demographic factors.  
Although not dealing explicitly with migrants, Angrist and Lang, 2004, estimate 
the impact of a de-segregation program (METCO) carried out in the Boston area, which 
transferred black students to the “whites only” schools in the more affluent Boston belt. 
They find no effect of de-segregation on the test scores of white students in the 
receiving schools and a modest effect on minority students. Non random allocation of 
black students is addressed by looking at the within-school variation across multiple 
classes in the same school.  
Similarly, Hoxby, 2000, identifies peer effects by exploiting the variation in the 
composition by gender and race of students attending a particular grade in adjacent 
years over a sample of schools. She finds that peer effects are stronger within races than 
across races, meaning that students of a given race are mainly influenced by students of 
the same race. This result is consistent with the findings by Card and Rothstein’s, 2007, 
indicating that segregation in racially homogenous schools widens the white-black gap 
in test scores. In their paper, the key issue of student sorting is resolved by aggregating 
micro-data by race and city and by taking first differences between races in each city. 
This strategy removes sorting both across schools and across cities.  
Hanushek et al. (2002) use panel data on student careers to estimate the peer 
effect of different racial groups on individual tests scores. Identification is achieved by 
exploiting the fact that students move from one school to another (about 20% of the 
entire sample). Their results show that a higher share of black schoolmates has a strong 
adverse effect on the achievement of blacks. In contrast, racial composition has a 
noticeably smaller effect on achievement of whites and Hispanics. Finally, 
Ammermuller and Pischke, 2006, investigate whether students are randomly allocated 
across classes of the same school or whether there exists ability grouping. They   6
conclude that allocation is non-random for immigrant students and that classes with 
more immigrant students tend to have better teachers
4.  
 
3. The empirical setup 
 
  We address the endogenous sorting of students across schools and classes by 
aggregating data at the country level. We use repeated country observations over time 
and identify the relationship between the share of immigrants and the test scores of 
natives by exploiting the country by time variations in the data. Our empirical model is   
 
crt r t c ct ct crt X m y                        ( 1 )  
 
where y is the test score of 15 years - old native pupils in subject r, m is the 
average share of their 15 years - old immigrant peers in country c and time t, X is a 
vector of additional country by time controls and  c  ,  t   and  r   are country, time and 
subject effects, which we capture with country, time and subject dummies. While 
aggregation allows us to sidestep the problems generated by the sorting of students 
among schools, it does not eliminate the selection of immigrants across countries of 
destination. For instance, positive school expenditure shocks affecting a country could 
increase test scores and at the same time attract more immigrants in the country if 
additional expenditure is induced by higher income per capita.  
This type of selection is captured in part by country and time dummies. To 
control for country by time effects, we include in the vector X the growth rate and the 
level of real GDP per capita as well as secondary school expenditure per pupil as 
percentage of GDP per capita. We also condition on the total stock of immigrants in the 
country. Conditional on this stock, the share of immigrant pupils who are in school at 
age 15 in a given country is mainly determined by demographic factors and is as good 
as random. By conditioning on the stock of immigrants, we implement at the country 
level the approach used by Gould, Lavy and Paserman, 2009, at the school level, with 
an important difference: while they need to worry about the residual correlation between 
                                                 
4 In a recent paper, Neymotin, 2009, looks at the effect of immigrants on SAT scores of native Americans 
and finds evidence of a positive relationship.   7
the share of immigrants and unobserved school characteristics, we control for 
unobserved country characteristics in a flexible way by using country dummies
5.  
Parameter θ in equation (1) measures the marginal effect of the average share of 
immigrant pupils on the average test score of 15 years - old native students. The linear 
specification does not consider the fact that – conditional on the mean share of 
immigrant pupils – the average test score of natives could vary with the distribution of 
immigrants within each country and among schools. In particular, average test scores 
could be lower – for a given average share of immigrants – when immigrant pupils 
concentrate in a few schools than when they are evenly distributed across all schools. 




















                           (2) 
 
where s is for the school, I the number of 15 years - old immigrant pupils and N the 
number of native pupils in the same age group. The index ranges between 0 (equal 
distribution) and 1 (full segregation). We try to capture the effects of segregation at the 
country level by adding to (1) both the index D and its interaction with the share of 
immigrant pupils. 
How does the marginal effect in (1) relate to the marginal effect at the school 
level? To illustrate this relationship, consider a country with N native and M immigrant 
students enrolled in S schools. Let ys be the average performance of native students 
attending school s and approximate the share of immigrant students in school s with the 
ratio  Ms/Ns, where Ms and Ns are immigrant and native students in school s. 
Furthermore, let the performance of natives in school s depend linearly on school 
characteristics and on the share of immigrants according to   
 
                                                 
5 Gould, Lavy and Paserman also control for school size by including in their regressions the total number 
of students enrolled in the 5th grade. We do not include in our regressions the country - specific 
population of students because we expect that, conditional on country fixed effects and the total number 
of immigrants, the residual country by time variation in the population of students aged 15 is very small.   8
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where the marginal effect  s   is allowed to vary among schools. Aggregation of (3) at 
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The country – specific marginal effect   turns out to be the weighted average of the 




4. The Data 
 
  We use data from the four available waves – 2000, 2003, 2006 and 2009 - of the 
OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). PISA is a large scale 
project that measures the cognitive abilities of 15 years - old students, using 
standardized tests that focus on reading, mathematics and science skills. The project 
compares average scores across countries, but also monitors trends over time in student 
performance. Each wave focuses on a major domain (reading, maths or science) and 
treats the rest as minor domains. As suggested by PISA technical reports, we enhance 
the comparability over time for each domain by retaining only the wave where it is 
treated as major and the following waves
7. Therefore, we use all four waves for reading 
and exclude wave 2000 for maths and waves 2000 and 2003 for science.  
  We define immigrant students as pupils born abroad from two foreign parents. A 
broader definition adds those born in the country from foreign parents (second 
generation immigrants). PISA data include information on parental background, such as 
                                                 
6 Equation (4) holds in first approximation ( 1 ln   s s y y ) when the dependent variable is the log of 
school performance. 
7 See OECD, Comparison over Time on the PISA Scales, Paris, 2007.   9
the educational attainment of each parent and the number of books in the household. 
Following Wossmann, 2005, we select the latter indicator to capture country by time 
variations in environmental factors affecting test score performance
8.    
PISA assesses students aged between 15 years and 3 (complete) months and 16 
years and 2 (complete) months at the beginning of the assessment period, who are 
enrolled in an educational institution at grade 7 or higher. The sample is two-stage 
stratified: in the first stage, schools are randomly selected in each country. In the second 
stage, 35 students are randomly selected from each school. The sampling standards used 
in PISA permit countries to exclude up to 5 percent of the relevant population, either by 
excluding schools (up to 2.5 percent) or by excluding students (up to 2.5 percent of the 
relevant population). One exclusion criterion is that the student has limited proficiency 
in the assessment language
9. Since immigrants are most likely to have insufficient 
language experience, this sampling design implies that the measured share of 
immigrants in the school is likely to be under-estimated. We use the information 
provided by PISA at the country level both on the weighted number of students 
excluded because of language problems and on the weighted number of participating 
students to correct this bias in the measure of the share of immigrants, under the 
plausible assumption that students excluded because of language problems are typically 
immigrants.  
As discussed at length by Aydemir and Borjas, 2010, sampling error in the 
measure of the share of immigrants can lead to substantial attenuation of the estimated 
effect of immigration on test scores. This bias can be particularly relevant in setups that 
use longitudinal information and control for fixed effects, as in the current study. 
Aydemir and Borjas suggest strategies to deal with this problem, which include 
instrumental variables estimation.  
We exclude from the sample the countries with an average share of immigrant 
pupils in schools below 1 percent in all the four waves (Japan, Korea among others) and 
with less than two observations on the share of immigrants (Singapore among others). 
Additional countries, including Lichtenstein, Argentina and Macao, are excluded 
because of missing data for the selected controls in vector X. We also exclude 
                                                 
8 PISA produces a qualitative indicator of the number of books, that ranges from 1 (0-10 books) to 6 
(more than 500 books). 
9 An additional criterion for exclusion is disability. See PISA Technical Report 2006, OECD, Paris.   10
Luxembourg and Hong Kong because of their limited size. We end up with a sample of 
27 countries, mainly from Europe and the Anglo-Saxon world. Selected summary 
statistics by country are reported in Table 1. The share of first generation 15 years –old 
immigrant students (born abroad from foreign parents) is close to or above 10 percent in 
Switzerland, Australia and New Zealand and below 2 percent in Latvia, Hungary, 
Finland and Mexico. The other countries lie in between these two extremes. The 
average share in our sample is 4.8 percent, with a standard deviation equal to 0.035. 
While two thirds of the total variation in this share occurs between countries, one third 
takes place within countries and over time.  
As shown in Figure 1, there is a clear negative correlation between the share of 
immigrant pupils and the segregation index. For instance, countries such as New 
Zealand, where the share of immigrant pupils is relatively high, have a relatively more 
homogeneous distribution of immigrants across schools than Finland, where immigrant 
pupils are few. Table 1 shows that correcting the share of immigrants with the 
percentage of excluded pupils produces small adjustments. The addition of second 
generation immigrants (born in the country from foreign parents) increases substantially 
the adjusted share of immigrant students, which is equal on average to 9.9 percent 
(standard deviation: 0.067) and reaches 15 percent or above in Switzerland, Australia 
and New Zealand, the US, Israel and Germany.  
We collect data on GDP per capita measured in 2005 US dollars and on the 
expenditure per pupil in secondary education as percentage of GDP per capita from the 
World Bank World Development Indicators. The stock of immigrants by country and 




5. The Results 
 
We pool the data for the 27 countries, four waves and three domains (reading, 
maths and science) and obtain a final sample of 238 observations. Since the share of 
immigrants in equation (1) is at a higher level of aggregation than test scores, we cluster 
standard errors by country and time, and add to the variables in vector X the average 
                                                 
10 Trends in the International Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision   11
share of 15 years – old  male pupils and an indicator of the average number of books. In 
all specifications we use the log test score as the dependent variable. In the baseline 
specification we apply no correction to the share of immigrant pupils, which refers to 
students born abroad from foreign parents
11. Table 2 presents our estimates. The 
dependent variable in column (1) is the log average test score attained by 15 years - old 
native pupils. In columns (2) and (3) we distinguish between male and female natives, 
and in columns (4) and (5) we consider separately native pupils with a “good” and 
“poor” parental background, where “good” is for students who have a number of books 
in the household higher than or equal to the country mean, and “poor” is for those with 
fewer books.  
We find that the share of immigrant pupils attracts a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient (at least at the 10 percent level of confidence) in all the 
specifications in the table, except the one for natives with good parental background. 
The estimated effect is larger for females than for males and for natives with poor 
parental background than for better endowed pupils. While the former difference is not 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level of confidence, the latter is
12. The size of the 
estimated effect is small: a one percentage point increase in the share of immigrant 
students is expected to reduce the average test scores of natives by 0.275 percent in the 
full sample. This implies that doubling the share of immigrant pupils from the average 
4.8 percent to close to 10 percent reduces the average test score of natives by only 1.32 
to 1.96 percent. The largest effect is obtained in the case of native students with a 
relatively poor parental background.  
The small effect of the immigrant share on the test score of native pupils could 
be due, at least in part, to attenuation bias induced by measurement error. As argued by 
Aydemir and Borjas, 2010, the use of fixed effects in our panel of countries implies that 
there is little identifying variation left in the share of immigrant pupils, and that any 
measurement error in this share tends to play a disproportionately large role. We deal 
with this problem in two different ways. First, we use a corrected measure of the share 
of immigrants, obtained by adding to this share the percentage of students who were 
                                                 
11 The log-linear specification improves the goodness of fit of the estimates with respect to the linear 
specification. 
12 The test for gender differences in the marginal effect of the share of immigrants on the test scores of 
natives has p-value equal to 0.337. On the other hand, the p-value of the test for parental background 
differences is equal to 0.000.     12
excluded because of language barriers. Table 3 presents our estimates when the 
corrected measure is used. We find that the estimated effect of the share of immigrant 
pupils is slightly smaller in absolute value than in Table 2 and less precisely estimated 
in some specifications (columns (1) and (2)).  
Second, we implement the IV strategy suggested by Aydemir and Borjas, 
2010
13. These authors show that - even when the pre-aggregation sample size is in the 
order of 5000 observations per cell - the attenuation bias due to sampling error is about 
10-15 percent and increases exponentially when the sample declines, reaching 100 
percent with 500 observations per cell. Among the several methods suggested by 
Aydemir and Borjas to correct for the attenuation bias, one of the best performing is an 
adaptation of the IV strategy typically adopted to correct attenuation bias. The IV 
approach requires that two measurements of the variable subject to sampling error are 
available. By construction, while these measures are highly correlated, their 
measurement errors are not, whatever the error distribution. Therefore, the second 
measure can be used as instrument for the first. We randomly split the original sample 
of pupils into two half samples, compute the share of immigrants in both sub-samples 
and use the immigrant share in the second-half sample as instrument for the immigrant 
share of the first-half sample
14. The procedure is repeated 500 times to derive the 
empirical distribution of the parameter of interest. As shown in Table 4, we find that the 
absolute value of the estimated coefficients is only marginally larger than the estimates 
in the baseline Table 2. Therefore, attenuation bias is a minor problem in the current 
context
15.  
We investigate whether the average test scores of natives are affected by the 
distribution of immigrant pupils in the schools of each country by estimating equation 
(1) augmented with the segregation index D and its interaction with the share m
16. After 
                                                 
13 This strategy can only be applied to the raw share, because the information required to compute the 
corrected share is only available at the country level. 
14 This is an application of the unbiased split sample instrumental variable (USSIV) method proposed by 
Angrist and Krueger (1995). 
15 A similar conclusion can be reached if we apply the analytical formula provided by Aydemir and 
Borjas (2010, p. 12) to compute an approximate assessment of the sampling error bias. With an average 
cell size of 8001 observations (median: 4950 observations) and 105 cells, the expected sampling error 
bias is only 4.4 percent. Notice that Aydemir and Borjas  recommend to use this formula in settings with 
at least 50-100 cells. Since our case is close to the boundary, we prefer to use the IV method discussed in 
the text.    
16 Since PISA provides data on excluded students only at the national level, we miss the information 
required to correct the segregation index. Therefore, we use the uncorrected measure of the share of   13
some experimentation, we find that the most parsimonious specification includes only 
the interaction between the share and the index. Table 5 presents the OLS estimates and 
Table 6 the IV estimates based on the approach suggested by Aydemir and Borjas.  
It turns out that the interaction of the share of immigrant pupils with D attracts a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient in all specifications but the one for 
natives with a good parental background. Hence, a reduction in the share of immigrants 
has a larger positive effect on the test scores of natives when the segregation index is 
higher. Again, the estimated effect is small: when we consider the estimates in the first 
column of Table 5 and evaluate the marginal effect of m at the country-specific values 
of D, we find that one additional percentage point in the share of immigrants reduces the 
school performance of natives by about 0.5 percent in Latvia, Czech Republic and 
Mexico, the three countries with the highest D, and by about 0.3 percent in Switzerland, 
Russia and New Zealand, the three countries with lowest segregation.  
Our estimates also show that average test scores are higher when the share of 
educational expenditure per student on GDP per capita and the average number of 
books are higher. No statistically significant effect is found instead for real GDP per 
capita and its growth and for the stock of immigrants. There is also evidence that the 
average share of boys in schools has a positive effect on the average math test scores of 
natives
17. This result is at odds with the findings by Hoxby, 2000, and Lavy and 
Schlosser, 2007. The latter study, for instance, finds that educational outcomes in Israel 
primary, middle and high schools are higher when the proportion of boys is smaller
18.  
 
6. Robustness and extensions 
 
  Our estimates of equation (1) assume that the effect of the share of immigrants 
on the test scores of natives is homogeneous across countries. We have relaxed this 
assumption by allowing the size of the effect to vary with the index of segregation D. 
We have also replicated our estimates of equation (1) on the sub-sample of countries for 
                                                                                                                                               
immigrants, both in schools and at the country level, and rely on our previous finding that correcting the 
share of immigrants has minor effects on the estimates. 
17 We also interact subject dummies with the number of books and the share of immigrants but find that 
these interactions are never jointly different from zero. 
18 Whitmore, 2005, finds mixed results when studying performance in US kindergarten and primary 
schools. She uses the gender variation generated by the random assignment of students into classrooms in 
the Tennessee’s Project STAR.   14
which the null hypothesis of a common effect of the share of immigrants is not rejected. 
It turns out that the marginal effect of m on y is negative, statistically significant and 
close to the value shown in the first column of Table 2. We infer from this that failure to 
allow for heterogeneous effects has rather marginal consequences on our results
19.  
In our empirical estimates we have used a log-linear specification, which gives a 
better fit than a linear specification. Not reported here, we have also estimated a linear 
specification, with no relevant changes in the size of the estimated elasticity of native 
test scores with respect to the share of immigrant pupils. 
Finally, we consider in Table 7 a broader definition of immigrant pupils, which 
includes also the 15 years – old students who are born in the country from foreign 
parents (second generation immigrants). On the one hand, since these students are more 
integrated than first generation immigrants, the negative effect on the performance of 
natives could be lower in absolute value when we use this broader definition. On the 
other hand, the negative effect could be higher, not lower, if the marginal effect of the 
share of immigrants on the performance of natives increases with the share of 
immigrants. We compare our estimates in Table 3 and 7 and conclude that using a 
broader definition of immigrant pupils changes only slightly the marginal effect of the 
share of immigrant pupils on the test scores of natives.  
   
Conclusions 
 
The proportion of immigrant students has increased over time in most developed 
countries, especially during the last two decades. Many parents and politicians fear that 
too many immigrant students could have a negative influence on the school 
performance of natives, either because of negative peer effects or because immigrants – 
with their limited proficiency in the language of the host country – can reduce teacher 
attention for natives. In Italy, for instance, the Education Minister has taken public 
sentiment very seriously and established a threshold of 30 percent to the number of 
immigrant pupils in Italian classes.   
                                                 
19 The estimated coefficient of m in the sub-sample of countries for which pooling is not rejected from a 
statistical point of view is -0.226, smaller in absolute value but rather close to the coefficient reported in 
Table 2.   15
Is this fear supported by empirical evidence? Using cross country aggregate data 
from the PISA project, we have reached the following conclusions. First, there is 
evidence that a higher share of immigrant pupils in secondary schools reduces the test 
scores of natives, especially those with a relatively disadvantaged parental background. 
The size of the effect, however, is small and varies with the sub-group of natives. Our 
cross country estimates suggest that doubling the share of immigrant pupils in a country 
reduces the average test scores of 15 years - old male and female natives in secondary 
schools by 1.3 and 1.7 percent respectively. This effect is slightly higher (about 2 
percent) for natives with disadvantaged parental background. Second, there is evidence 
that the marginal effect of the share of immigrant pupils on the test score of natives is 
higher in absolute value, but still small in size, in those countries where immigrants are 
concentrated in few schools and the segregation index is higher.  
We have also shown that the negative effect of immigrant students on natives is 
not borne within each country by all native students to the same extent. To further 
illustrate this point, we notice that, in our sample of countries, about 51 percent of all 
native students have no immigrant peers in their schools, and the average proportion of 
immigrant students in the schools attended by at least some immigrants is 11.3 percent. 
As a thought experiment, consider two hypothetical schools in a country, equal in all 
respects except for the share of immigrant students, equal to zero in first and to 11.3 
percent in the second school. Our baseline estimates in Table 2 suggest that the test 
scores of natives are 1.93 to 4.62 percent lower in the second school because of the 
presence of immigrant students.  
This gap is much larger when we compare a school belonging to the top decile 
of the distribution of the share of immigrants with a school without immigrants. In 
countries where the share of immigrant students in the schools of the top decile is high - 
Austria, Greece, Israel, Switzerland and New Zealand - the estimated gap in the test 
scores of natives with schools having no immigrants can exceed 10 percent and is close 
to 20 percent when we focus on the sub-sample of natives with poor family background.  
These are the students who typically end up in schools with a high percentage of 
immigrants and who would benefit substantially by reallocation to schools without 
immigrant pupils.  
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   Table 1. Test scores and the share of immigrant pupils; by country 





% immigrant students 
– broader definition 
Segregation 
index 
Australia 522.2 0.102 0.105  0.221  0.494 
Austria 507.5  0.067  0.073  0.138  0.551 
Belgium 526.0 0.057  0.060  0.129  0.598 
Switzerland 529.4  0.098  0.104  0.221  0.442 
Canada 533.3  0.097  0.104  0.211  0.689 
Czech Rep.  500.8  0.008  0.009  0.018  0.815 
Germany 519.9 0.065 0.068  0.145  0.521 
Denmark 506.9 0.030 0.039  0.081  0.595 
Spain 486.8  0.054  0.066  0.074 0.607 
Finland 549.0  0.014  0.017  0.022  0.769 
France 506.9  0.030  0.032  0.127  0.662 
Greece 471.3  0.060  0.062  0.077  0.631 
Hungary 491.1 0.014 0.015  0.019  0.702 
Ireland 508.7  0.042  0.046  0.057  0.481 
Iceland 501.3  0.012  0.021  0.023  0.712 
Italy 480.0  0.028  0.033  0.040  0.629 
Israel 455.2  0.085  0.089  0.196 0.581 
Latvia 486.9  0.006  0.006 0.060 0.856 
Mexico 415.2  0.015  0.016  0.022  0.802 
Netherlands 531.8  0.034  0.034  0.111  0.548 
Norway 500.9  0.031  0.038  0.066  0.577 
New Zealand  528.6  0.144 0.160  0.227  0.473 
Portugal 480.9  0.027  0.030  0.052  0.650 
Russia 466.0  0.048  0.048 0.096  0.471 
Sweden 513.0  0.046  0.052  0.115  0.596 
UK 508.1  0.035  0.038  0.089  0.692 
USA 498.4  0.058  0.065  0.162  0.634 
Note: col. 1: average score in reading, mathematics and science over the selected waves. col. 2: average share of immigrant pupils 
aged 15; col. 3: corrected average share of immigrant pupils. col. 4: corrected average share of immigrants, including those born in 
the country from foreign parents. Source: PISA   
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Table 2. OLS estimates of the effects of the share of migrants on the test score of natives. Dependent 
variable: log test scores. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 





        
Share of immigrant pupils (marginal effect)  -0.275** -0.255* -0.326**  -0.171  -0.409*** 
  (0.135) (0.145) (0.141) (0.123)  (0.155) 
        
Education expenditure per capita   0.001** 0.001** 0.001**  0.001*  0.001*** 
as % of GDP per capita  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Growth rate of real GDP per capita  0.041 0.047 0.031  0.072**  -0.007 
  (0.036) (0.038) (0.037) (0.029)  (0.042) 
Real GDP per capita  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001  -0.002 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) 
Average number of books in household  0.032 0.035*  0.033*  0.049***  0.066*** 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.008)  (0.012) 
Total stock of immigrants  0.000 0.001 -0.002  -0.002 0.001 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003) 
Percentage boys  0.052  0.007 0.240* 0.095  0.111 
  (0.120) (0.133) (0.121) (0.122)  (0.147) 
Percentage boys * Mathematics  0.658*** 0.590***  0.544**  0.590***  0.698*** 
  (0.194) (0.187) (0.220) (0.179)  (0.214) 
Percentage boys * Science  0.366* 0.366  0.210 0.324* 0.431* 
  (0.198) (0.226) (0.180) (0.174)  (0.226) 
        
Observations  238 238 238 238  238 
R-squared  0.924 0.933 0.924 0.927  0.906 
Notes: each regression includes country, subject and time dummies. Robust standard errors clustered by country and time 
within parentheses. ***, **, * when estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of 
confidence.  
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Table 3. OLS estimates of the effects of the corrected share of migrants on the test score of natives. 
Dependent variable: log test scores. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 





        
Corrected share of immigrant pupils   -0.238* -0.203  -0.287**  -0.226*  -0.392** 
(marginal effect)  (0.133) (0.146) (0.135) (0.129)  (0.170) 
        
Education expenditure per capita   0.001** 0.001* 0.001**  0.001  0.001* 
as % of GDP per capita  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) 
Growth rate of real GDP per capita  0.041 0.047 0.031  0.072**  -0.007 
  (0.036) (0.038) (0.037) (0.029)  (0.042) 
Real GDP per capita  0.039 0.046 0.027 0.068 -0.005 
  (0.037) (0.039) (0.037) (0.041)  (0.062) 
Average number of books in household  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004* 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) 
Total stock of immigrants  0.031 0.033 0.028 0.027  0.022 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)  (0.028) 
Percentage boys  0.046 -0.003  0.249**  0.017  -0.105 
  (0.120) (0.133) (0.121) (0.135)  (0.160) 
Percentage boys * Mathematics  0.657*** 0.590***  0.536**  0.571***  0.711*** 
  (0.194) (0.187) (0.219) (0.181)  (0.215) 
Percentage boys * Science  0.367*  0.367 0.197 0.281 0.404* 
  (0.199) (0.226) (0.178) (0.188)  (0.239) 
        
Observations  238 238 238 238  238 
R-squared  0.924 0.933 0.923 0.917  0.890 
Notes: see Table 2. 
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Table 4. IV estimates of the effects of the share of migrants on the test score of natives. Averages over 
500 replications. Dependent variable: log test scores. 
Notes: Standard deviation of the empirical distribution of parameters between parentheses. Average standard errors between  
squared brackets. Each regression includes country, time and subject dummies. Robust standard errors clustered by country 
and time.  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 





          
Share of immigrants in school  -0.281 -0.265  -0.330 -0.169  -0.422 
(marginal effect)  (0.057) (0.068)  (0.066) (0.059)  (0.070) 
  [0.153] [0.165]  [0.162] [0.142]  [0.178] 
          
Education expenditure per capita   0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001  0.001 
as % of GDP per capita  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
          
Growth rate of real GDP per capita 0.039  0.046  0.027  0.070  -0.009 
  (0.017) (0.022)  (0.020) (0.021)  (0.020) 
  [0.038] [0.040]  [0.040] [0.032]  [0.045] 
          
Real GDP per capita  -0.003 -0.003  -0.003 -0.002  -0.003 
  (0.000) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
  [0.002] [0.002]  [0.002] [0.002]  [0.002] 
          
Average number of books in   0.031 0.035  0.033 0.048  0.063 
household  (0.006) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.004)  (0.004) 
  [0.019] [0.019]  [0.017] [0.009]  [0.013] 
          
Total stock of immigrants  0.000 0.002  -0.002  -0.001  0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
  [0.002] [0.003]  [0.002] [0.002]  [0.003] 
         
Percentage boys  -0.020 -0.035  0.137 0.014  0.013 
  (0.089) (0.098)  (0.092) (0.088)  (0.110) 
  [0.121] [0.132]  [0.125] [0.121]  [0.146] 
         
Percentage boys * Mathematics  0.551 0.478  0.441 0.494  0.584 
 (0.087)  (0.089)  (0.094) (0.083)  (0.096) 
 [0.180]  [0.178]  [0.198] [0.167]  [0.199] 
         
Percentage boys * Science  0.312 0.299  0.172 0.276  0.364 
 (0.076)  (0.084)  (0.078) (0.075)  (0.088) 
 [0.183]  [0.209]  [0.167] [0.163]  [0.209] 
         
Observations  238 238  238 238  238   22
Table 5. OLS estimates of the effects of the share of migrants and of the segregation index D on the test 
score of natives. Dependent variable: log test scores. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 





        
Share of immigrant pupils   -0.639** -0.518*  -0.834*** -0.329  -0.951*** 
interacted with D (marginal effect)  (0.288) (0.309) (0.296) (0.273)  (0.328) 
        
Education expenditure per capita   0.001** 0.001**  0.001*** 0.001*  0.001*** 
as % of GDP per capita  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Growth rate of real GDP per capita  0.041 0.047 0.031  0.072**  -0.007 
  (0.036) (0.038) (0.037) (0.029)  (0.042) 
Real GDP per capita  0.035 0.043 0.023  0.069**  -0.016 
  (0.036) (0.039) (0.036) (0.029)  (0.042) 
Average number of books in household  -0.003  -0.003 -0.003* -0.001  -0.002 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) 
Total stock of immigrants  0.030 0.033*  0.031*  0.049***  0.063*** 
  (0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.008)  (0.013) 
Percentage boys  0.040 -0.009  0.231* 0.084  0.087 
  (0.124) (0.137) (0.125) (0.125)  (0.152) 
Percentage boys * Mathematics  0.654*** 0.588***  0.538**  0.588***  0.693*** 
  (0.194) (0.188) (0.220) (0.179)  (0.215) 
Percentage boys * Science  0.357* 0.360  0.197 0.319* 0.417* 
  (0.198) (0.226) (0.180) (0.174)  (0.226) 
        
Observations  238 238 238 238  238 
R-squared  0.924 0.933 0.925 0.927  0.906 
Notes: see Table 2   23
 
Table 6. IV estimates of the effects of the share of immigrants interacted with the segregation index D 
on the test score of natives. Averages over 500 replications. Dependent variable: log test scores. 
Notes: see Table 4.  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 





          
Share of immigrants in school  -0.708 -0.580  -0.918 -0.357  -1.064 
Interacted with segregation index D  (0.155) (0.181)  (0.180) (0.158)  (0.193) 
  [0.357] [0.384]  [0.373] [0.344]  [0.412] 
          
Education expenditure per capita   0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001  0.001 
as % of GDP per capita  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] 
          
Growth rate of real GDP per capita 0.032  0.041  0.018  0.066  -0.019 
  (0.017) (0.022)  (0.020) (0.021)  (0.020) 
  [0.038] [0.041]  [0.039] [0.032]  [0.045] 
          
Real GDP per capita  -0.003 -0.003  -0.003 -0.002  -0.003 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
  [0.002] [0.002]  [0.002] [0.002]  [0.002] 
          
Average number of books in   0.030 0.034  0.032 0.047  0.060 
household  (0.006) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.004)  (0.004) 
  [0.019] [0.019]  [0.016] [0.009]  [0.013] 
          
Total stock of immigrants  0.001 0.002  -0.001  -0.001  0.003 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
  [0.003] [0.003]  [0.002] [0.002]  [0.003] 
          
Percentage boys  -0.025 -0.044  0.135 0.008  0.000 
  (0.089) (0.097)  (0.092) (0.087)  (0.110) 
  [0.124] [0.135]  [0.128] [0.123]  [0.149] 
          
Percentage boys * Mathematics  0.547 0.476  0.436 0.493  0.580 
  (0.088) (0.089)  (0.093) (0.083)  (0.096) 
 [0.180]  [0.179]  [0.198] [0.167]  [0.200] 
          
Percentage boys * Science  0.303 0.292  0.160 0.272  0.351 
  (0.076) (0.084)  (0.078) (0.075)  (0.088) 
 [0.185]  [0.210]  [0.168] [0.164]  [0.213] 
         
Observations  238 238  238 238  238   24
 Table 7. OLS estimates of the effects of the corrected share of migrants on the test score of natives. 
Broader definition of immigrants. Dependent variable: log test scores. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 





        
Broader share of immigrant pupils   -0.259* -0.228  -0.304**  -0.266*  -0.423** 
(marginal effect)  (0.136) (0.144) (0.137) (0.148)  (0.205) 
        
Education expenditure per capita   0.001** 0.001* 0.001**  0.001  0.001* 
as % of GDP per capita  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) 
Growth rate of real GDP per capita  0.041 0.047 0.031  0.072**  -0.007 
  (0.036) (0.038) (0.037) (0.029)  (0.042) 
Real GDP per capita  0.073* 0.076* 0.067*  0.102**  0.050 
  (0.038) (0.040) (0.039) (0.043)  (0.062) 
Average number of books in household  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003  -0.004 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) 
Total stock of immigrants  0.033 0.034* 0.030  0.029  0.025 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)  (0.028) 
Percentage boys  0.037 -0.010  0.236* 0.011  -0.122 
  (0.127) (0.139) (0.130) (0.142)  (0.173) 
Percentage boys * Mathematics  0.651*** 0.584***  0.529**  0.564***  0.701*** 
  (0.194) (0.187) (0.218) (0.181)  (0.215) 
Percentage boys * Science  0.387** 0.384*  0.222  0.302  0.437* 
  (0.194) (0.223) (0.174) (0.185)  (0.230) 
        
Observations  238 238 238 238  238 
R-squared  0.924 0.933 0.923 0.918  0.890 
Notes: see Table 2 
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